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Abstract—Despite their unprecedented performance in various domains, utilization of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in safety-critical
environments is severely limited in the presence of even small adversarial perturbations. The present work develops a randomized
approach to detecting such perturbations based on minimum uncertainty metrics that rely on sampling at the hidden layers during the
DNN inference stage. The sampling probabilities are designed for effective detection of the adversarially corrupted inputs. Being
modular, the novel detector of adversaries can be conveniently employed by any pre-trained DNN at no extra training overhead.
Selecting which units to sample per hidden layer entails quantifying the amount of DNN output uncertainty from the viewpoint of
Bayesian neural networks, where the overall uncertainty is expressed in terms of its layer-wise components - what also promotes
scalability. Sampling probabilities are then sought by minimizing uncertainty measures layer-by-layer, leading to a novel convex
optimization problem that admits an exact solver with superlinear convergence rate. By simplifying the objective function,
low-complexity approximate solvers are also developed. In addition to valuable insights, these approximations link the novel approach
with state-of-the-art randomized adversarial detectors. The effectiveness of the novel detectors in the context of competing alternatives
is highlighted through extensive tests for various types of adversarial attacks with variable levels of strength.
Index Terms—Adversarial input, Bayesian neural networks, attack detection, uncertainty estimation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Unprecedented learning capability offered by Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNNs) has enabled state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in diverse tasks such as object recognition and detec-
tion [1], [2], [3], speech recognition and language translation
[4], voice synthesis [5], and many more, to reach or even
surpass human-level accuracy. Despite their performance
however, recent studies have cast doubt on the reliability
of DNNs as highly-accurate networks are shown to be ex-
tremely sensitive to carefully crafted inputs designed to fool
them [6], [7], [8]. Such fragility can easily lead to sabotage
once adversarial entities target critical environments such as
autonomous cars [9], automatic speech recognition [10], and
face detection [3], [11], [12]. The extreme brittleness of con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs) for image classification
is highlighted since small adversarial perturbations on the
clean image, although often imperceptible to the human eye,
can lead the trained CNNs to classify the adversarial examples
incorrectly with high confidence. In particular, design of
powerful adversarial perturbations in environments with
different levels of complexity and knowledge about the
target CNN, known as white, grey, and black-box attacks,
have been investigated in several works [7], [13], [14], [15],
[16], [17]. These considerations motivate well the need for
designing robust and powerful attack detection mechanisms
for reliable and safe utilization of DNNs [18].
Defense against adversarial perturbations has been
mainly pursued in two broad directions: (i) attack detection,
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and (ii) attack recovery. Methods in the first category aim at
detecting adversarial corruption in the input by classifying
the input as clean or adversarial, based on tools as diverse
as auto-encoders [19], detection sub-networks [20], [21],
and dropout units [22]. On the other hand, methods in
the second category are based on recovery schemes that
robustify the classification by data pre-processing [23], [24],
adversarial training [25], [26], [27], sparsification of the
network [28], [29] and Lipschitz regularization [30], [31], to
name just a few.
Furthermore, the so-termed over-confidence of DNNs in
classifying “out-of-distribution,” meaning samples which lie
in unexplored regions of the input domain, or even “mis-
classified” samples, has been unraveled in [32], [33]. This
has motivated the need for uncertainty estimation as well as
calibration of the networks for robust classification. Modern
Bayesian neural networks target this issue by modeling the
distribution of DNN weights as random [34], and estimating
the DNN output uncertainty through predictive entropy,
variance, or mutual information [22], [35], [36], [37]. The
well-known dropout regularization technique is one such
approximate Bayesian neural network, now widely used in
training and testing of DNNs [38], [39].
Moreover, approaches relying on dropout units have
shown promising performance in successfully detecting
adversarial attacks, where other defense mechanisms fail
[13]. In particular, [22] utilizes randomness of dropout units
during the test phase as a defense mechanism, and ap-
proximates the classification uncertainty by Monte Carlo
(MC) estimation of the output variance. Based on the latter,
images with high classification uncertainty are declared as
adversarial. Recently, dropout defense has been generalized
to non-uniform sampling [40], where entries of the hidden-
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layers are randomly sampled, with probabilities propor-
tional to the entry values. This heuristic sampling of units
per layer is inspired by intuitive reasoning: activation units
with large entries have more information and should be
sampled more often [40]. However, analytical understand-
ing and connections with the Bayesian framework have not
been investigated.
The goal here is to further expand the understanding of
uncertainty estimation in DNNs, and thereby improve the
detection of adversarial inputs. The premise is that inherent
distance of the adversarial perturbation from the natural-
image manifold will cause the overall network uncertainty
to exceed that of the clean image, and thus successful
detection can be obtained.
To this end, and inspired by [40], we rely on random
sampling of units per hidden layer of a pre-trained net-
work to introduce randomness. Moreover, by leveraging
the Bayesian approach to uncertainty estimation, the overall
uncertainty of a given image is then quantified in terms of
its hidden-layer components. We then formulate the task
of adversary detection as uncertainty minimization by opti-
mizing over the sampling probabilities to provide effective
detection. Subsequently, we develop an exact solver with
super-linear convergence rate as well as approximate low-
complexity solvers for an efficient layer-by-layer uncertainty
minimization scheme. Furthermore, we draw connections
with uniform dropout [22] as well as stochastic approximate
pruning (SAP) [40], and provide an efficient implementation
of the novel approach by interpreting it as a non-uniform
dropout scheme. Extensive numerical tests on CIFAR10
and high-quality cats-and-dogs images in the presence of
various attack schemes corroborate the importance of our
designs of sampling probabilities, as well as the placement
of sampling units per hidden layer for improved detection
of adversarial inputs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An
overview on Bayesian inference and detection in neural
networks is provided in Section 2. The proposed class of
detectors is introduced in Section 3, and exact as well as
low-complexity approximate solvers for the layer-by-layer
uncertainty minimization are the subjects of Section 4. Im-
plementation issues are dealt with in Section 5, numerical
tests are provided in Section 6, and concluding remarks are
discussed in Section 7.
2 BAYESIAN NEURAL NETWORK PRELIMINARIES
Bayesian inference is among the powerful tools utilized for
analytically understanding and quantifying uncertainty in
DNNs [39], [41]. In this section, we provide a short review
on the basics of Bayesian neural networks, and move on to
the inference phase for adversary detection in Section 2.2,
which is of primary interest in this work.
Consider an L-layer deep neural network, which maps
the input x ∈ X to output y ∈ Y . The weights are denoted
by ω := {Wl}Ll=1, and are modeled as random variables
with prior probability density function (pdf) p(ω).
Given training input X := [x1,x2, ...,xn] and output
data Y := [y1,y2, ...,yn], it is assumed that the parameters
ω only depend on these (X,Y) data. As a result, the
predictive pdf for a new input xν can be obtained via
marginalization as [38]
p(yν |xν ,X,Y) =
∫
p(yν |xν , ω)p(ω|X,Y)dω (1)
which requires knowing the conditional p(ω|X,Y). The
complexity of estimating p(ω|X,Y) motivates well the
variational inference (VI) approach, where p(ω|X,Y) is
replaced by a surrogate pdf qθ(ω) that is parameterized
by θ. For qθ(ω), it is desired to: (D1) approximate closely
p(ω|X,Y); and, (D2) provide easy marginalization in (1)
either in closed form or empirically. To meet (D1), the
surrogate is chosen by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence KL(p(ω|X,Y), qθ(ω)), which is subsequently
approximated by the log evidence lower bound [42, p. 462]
LV I(θ) :=
∫
qθ(ω) log p(Y|X, ω)dω −KL(qθ(ω)||p(ω)) .
(2)
Finding qθ boils down to maximizing the log evidence lower
bound, that is, θVI = arg maxθ LVI(θ). A common choice for
qθ(ω) to also satisfy (D2) is described next.
2.1 Variational inference
A simple yet effective choice for qθ(ω) is a factored form
modeling the weights as independent across layers, that is
qθ(ω) =
L∏
l=1
q(Wl;Ml,θzl) (3)
where the l-th layer with hl hidden units is modeled as
Wl = Mldiag([zl,1, zl,2, . . . , zl,hl ]) , l = 1, . . . , L (4)
where Ml is an hl+1×hl deterministic weight matrix multi-
plied by a diagonal matrix formed by the binary random
vector zl := [zl,1, zl,2, . . . , zl,hl ] ∈ {0, 1}hl with entries
drawn from a pmf qz(zl;θzl) parameterized by θzl .
If the entries {zl,i} are i.i.d. Bernoulli with (identical)
probability (w.p.) pi, they effect what is referred to as uni-
form (across layers and nodes) dropout, which is known to
prevent overfitting [41]. Clearly, the parameter set θ :=
{Ml,θzl}Ll=1 = {Ml}Ll=1∪{pi} fully characterizes qθ(ω). The
dropout probability 1 − pi is preselected in practice, while
{Ml}Ll=1 can be obtained using the training data by max-
imizing the log evidence lower bound in (2). Nonetheless,
integration in (2) over all the Bernoulli variables is analyt-
ically challenging, while sampling from the Bernoulli pmf
is relatively cheap. This prompts approximate yet efficient
integration using Monte Carlo estimation. A more detailed
account of training Bayesian neural networks can be found
in [38], [42], [43]. Moving on, the ensuing subsection deals
with detection of adversarial inputs.
2.2 Bayesian detection of DNN adversaries
A Bayesian approach to detecting adversarial inputs during
the testing phase proceeds by approximating the predictive
pdf in (1) using the variational surrogate qθ(ω), as
p(yν |xν ,X,Y) ≈
∫
p(yν |xν , ω)qθ(ω)dω. (5)
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Deciphering whether a given input xν is adversarial entails
three steps: (S1) parametric modeling of qθ(ω); (S2) estimat-
ing the DNN output uncertainty captured by p(yν |xν ,X,Y);
and (S3) declaring xν as adversarial if the output uncer-
tainty exceeds a certain threshold, and clean otherwise.
These steps are elaborated next.
Step 1: Parametric modeling of qθ(ω). Recall that uniform
dropout offers a popular special class of qθ(ω) pdfs, and
has been employed in adversary detection [22]. Here, we
specify the richer model of qθ(ω) in (3) and (4) that will turn
out to markedly improve detection performance. Different
from uniform dropout, we will allow for (possibly corre-
lated) Bernoulli variables with carefully selected (possibly
non-identical) parameters. If such general {θzl}Ll=1 can be
obtained, matrices {Ml}Ll=1 are then found as follows.
Let {W(TR)l }Ll=1 be deterministic weight matrices ob-
tained via non-Bayesian training that we denote as (TR)1. We
will use W(TR)l to specify the mean of the random weight
matrix Wl in our Bayesian approach, meaning we choose
Eqz(zl;θl)[Wl]x(l−1) = W
(TR)
l x(l−1) ∀l, where x(l−1) is the
output of the (l − 1)st layer for a given input xν passing
through the DNN with deterministic weights {W(TR)l }Ll=1.
With W(TR)l available, we first design qz(zl;θzl); next, we
find θzl ; and then Ml, as
Ml = W
(TR)
l diag
†
(
Eqz(zl;θzl )[zl]
)
, l = 1, . . . , L (6)
where the pseudo-inverse † means that inverse entries are
replaced with zeros if Eqz(zl;θzl )[zl,i] = 0.
Step 2: Quantifying the DNN output uncertainty. Since
evaluation of p(yν |xν ,X,Y) in (5) is prohibitive, one can
estimate it using MC sampling. In particular, one can readily
obtain MC estimates of (conditional) moments of yν . For
instance, its mean and variance can be estimated as
Eqθ(ω)[yν |xν ; {θzl}Ll=1] ' y¯ν =
1
R
R∑
r=1
y(r)ν
and
Covqθ(ω)[yν |xν ; {θzl}Ll=1] '
1
R
R∑
r=1
y(r)ν y
>(r)
ν − y¯ν y¯>ν (7)
where y(r)ν is the output of the r-th DNN realized through
weights {W(r)l }Ll=1 with input xν . The predictive variance
is the trace of Covqθ(ω)[yν |xν ; {θzl}Ll=1] that we henceforth
abbreviate as Tr(Covqθ(ω)[yν |xν ]). Given xν , the latter has
been used to quantify output uncertainty as U(xν) =
Tr(Covqθ(ω)[yν |xν ]) [22]. Additional measures of uncer-
tainty will be presented in the next section.
Step 3: Detecting adversarial inputs. Given U(xν), detec-
tion of adversarial inputs is cast as testing the hypotheses{
H0 : xν = xcleanν U(xν) ≤ τ0
H1 : xν = xcleanν + nadvν U(xν) > τ0
(8)
where the null suggests absence of adversarial perturbation
(low variance/uncertainty below threshold τ0), while the al-
ternative in effect raises a red flag for presence of adversarial
input (high variance/uncertainty above threshold τ0).
1. Such as back propagation based on e.g., a cross-entropy criterion.
We will now proceed to introduce our novel variational
distribution model targeting improved detection of adver-
saries based on uncertainty minimization.
3 MINIMUM UNCERTAINTY BASED DETECTION
To design qz(zl;θzl), we will build on and formalize the
sampling scheme in [40] that is employed to specify the joint
pmf of the (generally correlated) binary variables {zl,i}hli=1
per layer l. To this end, we randomly pick one activation
unit output of the hl hidden units per layer l; and repeat
such a random draw C times with replacement. Let ζ(c)l
denote per draw c the hl × 1 vector variable
ζ
(c)
l = [ζ
(c)
l,1 , ζ
(c)
l,2 . . . ζ
(c)
l,hl
]> ∼ Categorical(pl) , c = 1, . . . , C
where each entry ζ(c)l,i is a binary random variable with
ζ
(c)
l,i =
{
1 if draw c picks the ith unit of hidden layer l
0 otherwise
and the hl × 1 vector pl with nonegative entries summing
up to 1 specifies the Categorical pmf of ζ(c)l .
With || denoting element-wise binary OR operation on
vectors {ζ(c)l }Cc=1, we define next the vector
zl := ζ
(1)
l || ζ(2)l || ... || ζ(C)l . (9)
Using zl as in (9) with {θzl = pl}Ll=1 to be selected, enables
finding the expectation and then Ml in (6). Determinis-
tic matrix Ml along with the variates {z(r)l }Rr=1 provide
the desired DNN realizations to estimate the uncertainty
U(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) = Tr(Covqθ(ω)[yν |xν ]) as in (7). In turn, this
leads to our novel adversarial input detector (cf. (8)){
H0 : xν = xcleanν min{pl}∀l U(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) ≤ τ0
H1 : xν = xcleanν + nadvν otherwise
(10)
where variational parameters {pl}Ll=1 are sought such that
uncertainty U(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) is minimized under H0.
The rationale behind our detector in (10) is that given
τ0, minimizing the uncertainty (test statistic) under H0
reduces the probability of false alarms. The probability of
detection however, depends on test statistic pdf under H1,
in which the adversarial perturbation nadvν is unknown in
practice. The premise here is that due to network instability
under H1, the sought probabilities {pl}Ll=1 will not reduce
uncertainty under H1 as effectively, thus the performance
of (10) will be better than that of (8). To corroborate this,
efficient solvers for the proposed minimization task, and
extensive tests in lieu of analytical metrics, are in order.
3.1 Uncertainty measures
In order to carry the hypothesis test in (10), one has options
for U(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) other than the conditional variance. For
DNNs designed for classification, mutual information has
been recently proposed as a measure of uncertainty [35]
Iˆ(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) := H(y¯ν)−
1
R
R∑
r=1
H(y(r)ν ) (11)
where superscript r indexes the pass of input xν through
the rth DNN realization with corresponding random output
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y
(r)
ν := [y
(r)
ν,1, y
(r)
ν,2, . . . , y
(r)
ν,K ]
> in aK-class classification task,
and H(.) is the entropy function2
H(yν) := −
K∑
k=1
yν,k log(yν,k). (12)
The test statistic in (10) requires finding {pl}Ll=1 by solving
min
{pl}Ll=1
Iˆ(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) (13)
which is highly non-convex. However, using Taylor’s ex-
pansion of the logarithmic terms in (12), one can approxi-
mate the mutual information in (11) with the variance score
Tr(Covqθ(ω)[yν ]) in (10), where the conditioning on xν has
been dropped for brevity [35]. As a result, the optimization
in (13) is approximated as
min
{pl}Ll=1
U(xν ; {pl}Ll=1) = Tr(Covqθ(ω)[yν ]) . (14)
To solve (14), one needs to express the objective in terms of
the optimization variables {pl} for all layers explicitly. To
this end, the following section studies a two-layer network,
whose result will then be generalized to deeper models.
3.2 Simplification of the predictive variance
Aiming at a convenient expression for the cost in (14),
consider first a two-layer network with input-output (I/O)
relationship3
yν = σsoftmax
(
W2σ(W1xν)
)
(15)
where W1,W2 are random matrices corresponding to the
weights of the two layers as in (6), while σsoftmax is the
softmax memoryless nonlinearity
σsoftmax(u) :=
[
eu1∑K
i=1 e
ui
,
eu2∑K
i=1 e
ui
, . . . ,
euK∑K
i=1 e
ui
]>
with u := [u1, u2, . . . , uK ]>, and the inner σ in (15) mod-
els a general differentiable nonlinearity such as tanh. Al-
though differentiability of the nonlinearities is needed for
the derivations in this section, the general idea will be later
tested on networks with non-differentiable nonlinearities
(such as ReLU) in the experiments.
Given trained weights {W(TR)l }2l=1, and using (4) and
(6), the random weight matrices are found as
Wl := Mldiag(zl) = W
(TR)
l Sl Dl l = 1, 2 (16)
where Sl = diag(zl) denotes the random sampling ma-
trix with pseudo-inverse diagonal mean given by Dl =
diag†
(
Eqz(zl;pl)[zl]
)
. Since E[Wl]x(l−1) = W
(TR)
l x(l−1),
the mean of Wl does not depend on pl, while its higher-
order moments do.
2. Entropy functions in (11) are also parameterized by {pl}Ll=1, but
we abbreviate them here as H(y¯ν) and H(y
(r)
ν ).
3. Derivations in this section carry over readily to a more general I/O
yν = σsoftmax
(
W2σ(W1xν +b1) +b2
)
with b1 and b2 deterministic.
Proposition 1. For the two-layer network in (15), the proposed
minimization in (14) can be approximated by
min
{pi≥0,1>pi=1}2i=1
Tr(CovW2 [W2σ(W
(TR)
1 xν)]) (17)
+ γTr(EW2 [W2W
>
2 ])Tr( CovW1 [W1xν ])
where γ is a constant. The solution of (17) proceeds in two steps
Step 1: p∗1 = arg minp1
Tr( CovW1 [W1xν ])
Step 2: p∗2 = arg minp2
Tr(CovW2 [W2σ(W
(TR)
1 xν)])
+γ′Tr(EW2 [W2W
>
2 ])
where γ′ := γTr( CovW1 [W1xν ])
∣∣∣
p1=p∗1
.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
Remark. The cost in (17) approximates that in (14) by casting
the overall uncertainty minimization as a weighted sum
of layer-wise variances. In particular, p∗1 is the sampling
probability vector that minimizes variance score of the first
layer. It subsequently influences the regularization scalar
γ′ in minimizing the second layer variance, which yields
the pmf vector p∗2. This can be inductively generalized to
L > 2 layers. As L increases however, so do the number of
cross terms. For simplicity and scalability, we will further
approximate the per-layer minimization by dropping the
regularization term, which leads to separable optimization
across layers. This is an intuitively pleasing relaxation, be-
cause layer-wise variance is minimized under H0, which
also minimizes the regularization weight γ′.
The resulting non-regularized approximant of step 2 is
p∗2 = arg minp2
Tr(CovW2 [W2σ(W
(TR)
1 xν)])
generalizing to the l-th layer in an L-layer DNN as
p∗l = arg minpl
Tr( CovWl [Wlx(l−1)]) (18)
where x(l−1) is the output of the (l − 1)st layer, regardless
of pmf vectors of other layers {pl′}l′ 6=l.
3.3 Layer-wise variance minimization
Here we will solve the layer-wise variance minimization in
(18). Using (16), the cost can be upper bounded by
Tr( CovWl [Wlx(l−1)])
= E
[
‖W(TR)l Sl Dlx(l−1) − E[W(TR)l Sl Dlx(l−1)]‖22
]
= E
[
‖W(TR)l Sl Dlx(l−1) −W(TR)l x(l−1)‖22
]
≤ ‖W(TR)l ‖22 E
[
‖Sl Dlx(l−1) − x(l−1)‖22
]
= ‖W(TR)l ‖22
hl∑
i=1
E[(SiiDiix(l−1),i − x(l−1),i)2]
= ‖W(TR)l ‖22
hl∑
i=1
x2(l−1),iE[(SiiDii − 1)2]
= ‖W(TR)l ‖22
hl∑
i=1
x2(l−1),i
(
1
pil,i
− 1
)
(19)
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. ?, NO. ?, ? 5
where the last equality follows because the C draws are
iid with replacement, and the binary random variables zl,i
reduce to Bernoulli ones with parameter pil,i = 1 − (1 −
pl,i)
C ; hence, for x(l−1),i 6= 0 it holds that E[S2iiD2ii] = 1/pil,i
and E[SiiDii] = 1, which implies that E[(SiiDii − 1)2] =
(1/pil,i)− 2 + 1.
Using (19), the optimization in (18) can be approximately
solved by a majorized surrogate as
min
p≥0,1>p=1
hl∑
i=1
1
1− (1− pl,i)C x
2
(l−1),i (20)
which is a convex problem that can be solved efficiently as
elaborated next.
4 SOLVING LAYER-BY-LAYER MINIMIZATION
Consider rewriting the layer-wise variance minimization in
(20) in a general form as
min
p≥0,1>p=1
h∑
i=1
αi
1− (1− pi)C . (21)
where αi := x2(l−1),i for the l-th layer. Over the feasible
set of the probability simplex, the cost in (21) has semi-
definite Hessian; thus, it is convex, and can be solved by
projected gradient descent iterations. However, p lies in the
probability simplex space of dimension h, the number of
hidden nodes in a given layer, and is typically very large.
The large number of variables together with possible ill-
conditioning can slow down the convergence rate.
To obtain a solver with quadratic convergence rate, we
build on the fact that hl is usually very large, which implies
that pi  1 for the practical setting at hand. Using the
inequality 1−(1−pi)C ≥ 1−e−Cpi , the cost in (21) can then
be tightly upperbounded, which leads to majorizing (21) as
min
p≥0,1>p=1
h∑
i=1
αi
1− e−Cpi . (22)
The KKT conditions yield the optimal solution of the convex
problem in (22), as summarized next.
Proposition 2. The optimization in (22) can be solved with
quadratic convergence rate, and the optimum is given by
p∗i = −
1
C
ln
(2ρ∗ + x2(l−1),i −√[2ρ∗ + x2(l−1),i]2 − 4ρ∗2
2ρ∗
)
(23)
where ρ∗ is the solution to the following root-finding problem
h∑
i=1
ln(2ρ+x2(l−1),i−
√
[2ρ+ x2(l−1),i]
2 − 4ρ2)−n ln(2ρ)+C = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
4.1 Approximate variance minimization for small C
For small values of C , it holds that (1 − pi)C > 1 − Cpi;
hence, the Bernoulli parameter pii = 1 − (1 − pi)C can be
approximated by its upperbound Cpi > pii. With this we
can approximate the cost in (20), as
min
p≥0,1>p=1
h∑
i=1
αi
Cpi
. (24)
Using the Lagrangian and the KKT conditions, we then find
p∗i =
√
αi/
∑
j
√
αj , which for the l-th layer is expressible as
p∗(l−1),i =
|x(l−1),i|∑hl
j=1 |x(l−1),j |
. (25)
This approximation provides analytical justification for
the heuristic approach in [40], where it is proposed to
sample with probabilities proportional to the magnitude of
the hidden unit outputs. However, there remains a subtle
difference, which will be clarified in Section 6.
Approximating (22) with (24) can be loose for large
values of C , which motivates our next approximation.
4.2 Approximate variance minimization for large C
Building on the tight approximation in (22), one can further
approximate the variance for large C as
min
p≥0,1>p=1
h∑
i=1
αi
1− e−Cpi ' minp≥0,1>p=1
h∑
i=1
αi(1 + e
−Cpi)
where we have used (1 − δ)−1 ' 1 + δ as a tight approxi-
mation for 0 < δ  1. This leads to the minimization
min
p≥0,1>p=1
n∑
i=1
αie
−Cpi
which again is a convex problem, whose solution can be
obtained using the KKT conditions that lead to
−Cαie−Cpˆ∗i + λ = 0 ∀i
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Under the simplex
constraint on the {pi}, this leads to the optimal
pˆ∗i =
[ 1
C
ln [Cx2(l−1),i] + βˆ
∗
]
+
(26)
with [ . ]+ denoting the projection on the positive orthant,
and the normalization constant β := − lnλ/C having opti-
mal value
βˆ∗ =
1−∑hi=1 pˆ∗i 1{pˆ∗i>0}∑h
i=1 1{pˆ∗i>0}
.
Although the solution to the fixed point condition cannot
be obtained at one shot, and may require a few iterations
to converge, in practice we only perform it once and settle
with the obtained approximate solution{pˆ∗i }hi=1.
5 PRACTICAL ISSUES
The present section deals with efficient implementation of
the proposed approach in practice, and estabishes links with
state-of-the-art Bayesian detection methods.
5.1 Efficient implementation via non-uniform dropout
The proposed defense builds on modeling the variational
pdf qθ(ω) using a sampling-with-replacement process. Per-
forming the proposed process however, may incur overhead
complexity during inference when compared to the inex-
pensive dropout alternative outlined in Sec. 2.1. To reduce
this complexity, one can implement our approach using
efficient approximations, while leveraging the sampling
probabilities learned through our uncertainty minimization.
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Reflecting on the binary variables {zl,i} that model the
pickup of the hidden node i in the overall sampling process
in (9), one can approximate the joint pmf of {zl,i}hli=1 as
qz(zl;pl) '
hl∏
i=1
qz(zl,i; pl,i) (27)
where random variables {zl,i}i are now viewed as ap-
proximately independent non-identical Bernoulli variables
with parameters {pil,i}hli=1; that is, zl,i ∼ Bernoulli(pil,i) for
i = 1, . . . , hl, where pil,i = 1− (1− pl,i)C .
Although (27) is an approximation, it provides insight
but also an efficient implementation of the sampling process.
In fact, the proposed optimization in (21) can now be viewed
as an optimization over the non-uniform dropout proba-
bilities, coupled implicitly through the hyper-parameter C ,
whose selection guarantees a certain level of randomness.
This is to be contrasted with finding optimal dropout proba-
bilities - a task requiring grid search over an hl-dimensional
space for layer l, where hl can be hundreds of thousands
to millions in CNNs classifying high-quality images. Inter-
estingly, the proposed convex optimization simplifies the
high-dimensional grid-search into a scalar root-finding task,
whose solution can be efficiently found with super-linear
(quadratic) convergence rate.
5.2 Placement and adjustment of the sampling units
It has been argued that CNN layers at different depths
can provide extracted features with variable levels of ex-
pressiveness [44]. On a par with this, one can envision
the defense potential at different depths by incorporating
sampling units across say B blocks of the network as listed
in Tables 2 and 3. In particular, the dropout defense has been
mostly utilized at the last layer after flattening [35], whereas
here we consider the potential of sampling at earlier layers
that has gone mostly under-explored so far. This can in turn
result in Bayesian DNN-based classifiers with robustness to
adversarial attacks, as optimal sampling at the initial layers
maybe crucial for correct detection of the adversarial input.
We henceforth refer to a DNN (or CNN) equipped with
random sampling as the detection network, and the original
one without the sampling units as the full network.
Similar to the pick up probability pi in uniform dropouts,
the number of draws C in our approach is a hyper pa-
rameter that controls the level of randomness present in
the detection network. Qualitatively speaking, the smaller
number of units (smaller C) is picked per layer, the larger
‘amount of randomness’ emerges (further pil,i is from 1).
This can lead to forward propagating not as informative
(under-sampled) features, meaning not representative of the
clean image, and can thus cause unreliable detection. A large
C on the other hand, increases the probability to pick up
units per layer, which requires a large number of MC realiza-
tions for reliable detection, otherwise small randomness will
lead to miss-detection. At the extreme, very large C renders
the detection and full networks identical, thus leading to
unsuccessful detection of adversarial inputs. In a nutshell,
there is a trade-off in selecting C , potentially different for
the initial, middle, and final layers of a given CNN.
Fig. 1 categorizes existing and the novel randomization-
based approaches to detecting adversarial inputs.
Algorithm 1: Adversary detection - fixed {pl,i}
Input: Test image xν , B,C, R and τ0
1 Pass image xν through full network; find {x(l−1),i}
2 Use {x(l−1),i} to obtain {pl,i} via (23), (25) or (26)
3 for r = 1, 2, . . . , R do
4 Collect output class y(r)ν
5 end
6 Estimate the mutual information (MI) of {y(r)ν }Rr=1
Output: Declare adversary if MI exceeds threshold τ0
Uniform dropout. In this method, units are independently
dropped w.p. 1− pi, and sampled (picked) w.p. pi ∀l, i.
Non-uniform dropout using variance minimization.
Dropout here follows the scheme in subsection 5.1, for
which we pursue the following two general cases with
deterministic and dynamic probabilities.
(C1) Variance minimization with fixed probabilities. In this
case, the image is first passed through the full network to
obtain the values {x(l−1),i} of the unit outputs per hid-
den layer. These are needed to determine the non-uniform
dropout probabilities 1−pl,i (thus pil,i and then the index of
the units to sample) via exact, linear, or logarithmic approxi-
mations given in (23), (25) and (26), respectively, refered to
as VM-exact, VM-lin, and VM-log; see Fig. 2-a.
Despite parallel MC passes in the proposed class of
sampling with fixed probabilities (step 3 in Fig. 2-a), the
first step still imposes a serial overhead in detection since
the wanted probabilities must be obtained using a pass
through the full network. Our approach to circumventing
this overhead is through approximation using the following
class of sampling with dynamic probabilities.
(C2) Variance minimization with dynamic probabilities.
Rather than finding the sampling probabilities beforehand,
p
(r)
l,i are determined on-the-fly as the image is passed through
the detection network with the units sampled per layer.
As a result, the observed unit values are random (after
passing through at least one unit sampled), and are different
across realizations. In order to mitigate solving many op-
timization problems, variance minimization with dynamic
probabilities is only implemented via linear and logarithmic
approximations (25) and (26); and are referred to as DVM-lin
and DVM-log, respectively; see Fig. 2-b.
Algorithm 2: Adversary detection - dynamic {pl,i}
Input: Test image xν , B,C, R and τ0
1 for r = 1, 2, . . . , R do
2 Collect y(r)ν after passing xν through the detection
network with units picked with dynamic
probabilities obtained (exactly or approximately)
using the observed values
3 end
4 Estimate the mutual information (MI) of {y(r)ν }Rr=1
Output: Declare adversary if MI exceeds threshold τ0
It is interesting to note that DVM-lin corresponds to the
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Bayesian approaches to detecting adversaries in DNNs
Uniform dropout
(Dropout)
Minimum uncertainty (variance) based
(non-uniform sampling)
Fixed/Deterministic
Exact
(VM-exact)
Linear apprx.
(VM-lin)
Logarithmic apprx.
(VM-log)
Dynamic
Linear apprx.
(SAP or DVM-lin)
Logarithmic apprx.
(DVM-log)
Fig. 1. Overview of Bayesian adversary detection schemes
a) Detection via deterministic sampling probabilities
b) Detection via dynamic sampling probabilities
Fig. 2. Schematic of the proposed detection schemes
proposed stochastic activation pruning (SAP) in [40], with
pSAPl,r =
 |x(r)(l−1),1|∑hl
i=1 |x(r)(l−1),i|
,
|x(r)(l−1),2|∑hl
i=1 |x(r)(l−1),i|
, ...,
|x(r)(l−1),hl |∑hl
i=1 |x(r)(l−1),i|

where x(r)(l−1),i is the output of the i-th activation unit of the
l-th layer in the r-th realization for input x.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the sampling methods,
while Algorithms 1 and 2 outline the two proposed variance
minimization-based detection methods in pseudocode.
6 NUMERICAL TESTS
In this section, we test the effectiveness of the proposed
Bayesian sampling method for detecting various adversarial
Algorithm 3: Layer-wise minimum variance solver
1 Solve: minp≥0,1>p=1
∑h
i=1
αi
1− (1− pi)C
Input : [α1, α2, . . . , αh], C
Output: Nonuniform dropout pmf pi = [pi1 . . . pih]>
2 Using bisection and initialization ρ0 =
∑h
i=1 αi/h,
find the root ρ∗ for∑
i ln(2ρ+αi−
√
(2ρ+ αi)2 − 4ρ2)−n ln(2ρ)+C = 0
3 Set
p∗i = −
1
C
ln
(2ρ∗ + αi −√(2ρ∗ + αi)2 − 4ρ∗2
2ρ∗
)
∀i
4 Set pi∗i = 1− (1− p∗i )C ∀i
Dataset image size # train # val. # test
CIFAR10 32 x 32 50,000 2,000 8,000
Cats-and-dogs 224 x 224 10,000 2,000 13,000
TABLE 1: CIFAR10 and cats-and-dogs image-classification
datasets
attacks on CNNs used for image classification. In order to
address the raised issue in [13], classification of the CIFAR10
image dataset using ResNet20 as well as the high-resolution
cats-and-dogs images using ResNet34 networks [45] are
tested. A short summary of the two networks and datasets
can be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3. In order to investigate the
issue around placement of the sampling units, we will place
them after ReLU activation layers in different “blocks” (B)
of the ResNet20 and ResNet34 networks, as listed in Tables
2 and 3. Numerical tests are made available online.4
6.1 CIFAR10 dataset
ResNet20 is trained using 20 epochs with minibatches
of size 128. Adversarial inputs are crafted on the corre-
sponding MC network as in [35], using the fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) [46], the basic iterative method (BIM)
[47], the momentum iterative method (MIM) [48], and the
Carlini-and-Wagner (C&W) [14] attacks. Parameters of the
attacks as well as test accuracy of the MC network on clean
and adversarial inputs are reported in Table 4.
Placement parameter B and sampling parameters C
for variance minimization methods as well as the dropout
4. https://github.com/FatemehSheikholeslami/variance-
minimization
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name output-size 20 layers #sampling
units
Block1 32 x 32 [ 3 x 3, 16] 1
Block2 32 x 32
[
3× 3, 16
3× 3, 16
]
× 3 6
Block3 16 x 16
[
3× 3, 32
3× 3, 32
]
× 3 6
Block4 8 x 8
[
3× 3, 64
3× 3, 64
]
× 3 6
average pool,
64-d fully conn.,
softmax
Block5 1 x 1 1
TABLE 2: ResNet20 architecture on CIFAR10 dataset
output-size 34 layers #sampling
units
Block 1 112 x 112 [7 x 7, 64],
3x3 max-pool
2
Block2 56 x 56
[
3× 3, 64
3× 3, 64
]
× 3 6
Block3 28 x 28
[
3× 3, 128
3× 3, 128
]
× 4 8
Block4 14 x 14
[
3× 3, 256
3× 3, 256
]
× 6 12
Block5 7 x 7
[
3× 3, 512
3× 3, 512
]
× 3 6
average pool,
1000-d fc,
softmax
Block 6 1 x 1 1
TABLE 3: ResNet34 architecture on cats-and-dogs dataset
probability for uniform dropout are selected by cross vali-
dation. To clarify the suboptimality gap between the exact
and approximate variance minimization with deterministic
sampling probabilities, we have cross-validated the param-
eters for VM-exact, and reused them for VM-lin and VM-log
approximates.
The sampling parameter is selected as C = f × nnz(xl)
for the l-th layer sampling unit, where nnz(.) denotes the
number of non-zero entries5, and f is the sampling ra-
tio varied in f ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0}.6
Probability in uniform dropout is also varied as pidrop ∈
{0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.7}, and the number of MC runs is R = 20.
In order to properly evaluate accuracy in detection of
adversarial images, we only aim at detecting the test sam-
ples that are correctly classified by the full network, and
misclassified after the adversarial perturbation. The detec-
tion performance is then reported in terms of the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig. 3, obtained
by varying the threshold parameter τ0. The exact area-
under-curve values along with parameters B, f, pidrop are
also reported in Tables 5 and 6, highlighting the improved
detection via the proposed variance minimization approach.
5. This selection is chosen by taking into account the fact that, only
non-zero samples will be dropped upon not being selected, while zero
entries will remain unchanged regardless of the sampling outcome.
6. Since the sampling procedure is modeled with replacement, frac-
tion f may be selected greater than 100%.
Furthermore, in order to target more realistic scenaria,
where attack generation is unknown and may indeed be
crafted via various methods, we have also tested the per-
formance against a “combination attack,” in which the
adversarial input crafted with all 7 settings of attacks are
considered. This indeed corroborates that placement of the
sampling units in the fourth block along with careful tun-
ing of the sampling probabilities via VM-exact provides
the highest curve against combination of attacks, while its
approximations follow in performance, outperforming uni-
form dropout. For further discussion on sensitivity against
parameter selection, see Appendix 8.3.
6.2 Cats-and-dogs dataset
Tests are also carried out for the cats-and-dogs dataset,7
which consists of high-quality images classified into binary
classes of cats and dogs. Images are resized to 224 × 224,
and are classified using ResNet34 [45]. Weights of the con-
volutional layers are transferred from the network trained
on the ImageNet dataset.8 This is subsequently followed
by a dropout, 1000 × 2 fully-connected and softmax layer,
whose weights are trained using 10, 000 images; see Table
1. The FGMS, BIM, MIM, an C&W attacks are crafted, and
parameters are reported in Table 7. Detection parameters are
similarly selected by using the validation set and varying
B ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, f ∈ {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0},
where C = f × nnz(xl), pidrop ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.7}, and the
number of MC runs is R = 20.
Fig. 4 plots the ROC curve for detection of adversarial
versus clean images, and defense parameters are reported
in Tables 8 and 7, quantifying the accuracy of attack detec-
tion across different methods. As with CIFAR10, tests are
also extended to a combination attack, where detection is
performed against the combination of all seven attacks with
a fixed set of defense parameters B, f , and pidrop.
Interestingly, it is observed that for small values of f ,
the linear approximation for variance minimization (VM-
lin) follows the performance of the exact variance minimiza-
tion (VM-exact) closely for FGSM, MIM, and C&W attacks,
whereas the logarithmic approximation (VM-log) exhibits
a large gap in performance. In contrast, for large values
of f , VM-log demonstrates a smaller optimality gap with
VM-exact as opposed to VM-lin; see Figs. 4 (c) and (f). This
corroborates our approximations in (24) and (26), providing
high-performance low-complexity substitutes for the exact
variance-minimization solver in both small and large sam-
pling regimes, that is f < 1 and f > 1. Similarly, improved
performance of the logarithmic approximates versus the
linear ones are also corroborated in the high-quality cats-
and-dogs images versus CIFAR10, due to higher C resulting
from higher dimensional vectors x(l) in the hidden layers.
The ROC curves further demonstrate that performance
of the deterministic sampling probabilities, obtained by
passing the image through the full network, are often supe-
rior to the dynamic ones (SAP and DVM-log), among which
DVM-log demonstrates better performance.
7. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=54765
8. https://github.com/qubvel/classification models
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a) FGSM attack with  = 10 b) MIM attack with  = 10 c) BIM attack with  = 10
d) FGSM attack with  = 20 e) MIM attack with  = 20 f) BIM attack with  = 20
g) C&W attack h) Combination attack
Fig. 3. ROC-curve of different attack-detection sampling schemes on CIFAR10 dataset against different attacks.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH OUTLOOK
Safe and reliable utilization of state-of-the-art CNNs is con-
tingent upon robustifying their performance against adver-
sarial perturbations. To this end, we have investigated at-
tack detection in Bayesian neural networks, where through
imposing a certain level of randomness we designed the
variational distribution to minimize network uncertainty.
The premise is that the inherent distance of the adversarial
perturbation from the natural-image manifold will cause
the overall network uncertainty to exceed that of the clean
image, and thus facilitate successful detection. Network
uncertainty was expressed as a summation of its layer-wise
components, whose exact as well as approximate minimiz-
ers have been developed. Links with recent sampling-based
approaches have been delineated, along with efficient im-
plementations of the proposed approach. Finally, numerical
tests on the CIFAR10 and the cats-and-dogs datasets on
deep state-of-the-art CNNs demonstrated the importance of
placement as well as tuning of the sampling parameters,
which readily translate to improved attack detection.
Among future directions, one can incorporate the novel
approach in attack correction schemes based on randomiza-
tion. This is of particular importance for careful sampling
at the initial layers of the network. One can further exploit
an ensemble of detection networks, in which sampling units
are incorporated at random depths. In addition to increased
defense strength, the latter introduce a second source of
randomness in the defense mechanism, and thus prevent
identification by the attackers.
8 APPENDIX
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Define uν := W2σ(W1xν) and approximate it using the
first-order Taylor expansion around u¯ν := Eqθ(ω)[uν ], to
arrive at
yν ' σsoftmax(u¯ν) +∇σsoftmax(u)
∣∣∣
u=u¯ν
(uν − u¯ν) (28)
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clean FGSM BIM MIM C&W
norm:∞ norm:∞ # binary search: 10
Attack – – # iter: 20 # iter: 20 #max iter: 20
parameters iter : iter : learning rate:0.1
 = 10/255  = 20/255  = 10/255  = 20/255  = 10/255  = 20/255 initial const.: 10
Class. Acc. 91.5% 64.87% 56.91% 5.2% 5.0% 5.4% 5.1% 11.7%
TABLE 4: Attack parameters and test accuracy on clean and adversarial input in CIFAR10 dataset.
FGSM Attack MIM Attack
Sampling  = 10  = 20  = 10  = 20
Method Parameters AUC Parameters AUC Parameters AUC Parameters AUC
VM 81.9 88.7 74.4 81.0
VM-log (B, f) = (4, 2.0) 79.3 (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 84.3 (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 71.4 (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 78.3
VM-linear 77.9 84.5 71.8 77.7
DVM-log (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 78.4 (B, f) = (5, 0.7) 83.0 (B, f) = (5, 4.0) 70.3 (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 75.8
SAP (B, f) = (2, 4.0) 79.3 (B, f) = (3, 4.0) 85.3 (B, f) = (2, 3.0) 73.8 (B, f) = (3, 4.0) 79.1
Dropout (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.1) 77.0 (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.1) 81.0 (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.1) 69.6 (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.2) 76.5
TABLE 5: AUC-ROC of different attack-detection sampling schemes on CIFAR10 test set against FGSM and MIM attacks.
Higher values indicate better detection.
BIM Attack C&W Attack Combination Attack
Sampling  = 10  = 20
Method parameters AUC parameters AUC parameters AUC parameters AUC
VM 67.0 65.6 81.6 76.0
VM-log (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 62.6 (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 62.0 (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 79.6 (B, f) = (4, 4.0) 72.8
VM-linear 63.1 62.5 79.3 72.9
DVM-log (B, f) = (1, 3.0) 64.8 (B, f) = (1, 4.0) 62.9 (B, f) = (5, 0.8) 77.8 (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 71.4
SAP (B, f) = (2, 1.5) 71.2 (B, f) = (2, 1.5) 69.3 (B, f) = (5, 4.0) 79.7 (B, f) = (2, 3.0) 74.2
Dropout (B, pidrp) = (2, 0.1) 69.6 (B, pidrp) = (2, 0.1) 68.0 (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.2) 78.8 (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.1) 71.7
TABLE 6: AUC-ROC of different attack-detection sampling schemes on CIFAR10 test set against FGSM, C&W, and
combination attacks. Higher values indicate better detection.
clean FGSM BIM MIM C&W
norm:∞ norm:∞ # binary search steps: 10
Attack – – # iter: 10 # iter: 20 #max iter: 20
parameters iter : 1.5 iter : 1.5 learning rate: 0.1
 = 10  = 20  = 10  = 20  = 10  = 20 initial const.: 10
Class. Acc. 94.5% 74.85% 70.5% 19.2% 18.4% 12.9% 9.9% 68.95%
TABLE 7: Attack parameters and test accuracy on clean and adversarial input in cats-and-dogs dataset.
FGSM Attack MIM Attack
Sampling  = 10  = 20  = 10  = 20
Method Parameters AUC Parameters AUC Parameters AUC Parameters AUC
VM 73.5 84.0 72.1 78.5
VM-log (B, f) = (2, 0.7) 57.2 (B, f) = (2, 0.7) 63.8 (B, f) = (2, 0.7) 58.1 (B, f) = (2, 0.7) 61.5
VM-linear 70.8 82.2 68.8 77.1
DVM-log (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 76.1 (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 84.5 (B, f) = (6, 0.7) 68.5 (B, f) = (1, 2.0) 83.9
SAP (B, f) = (6, 0.7) 70.3 (B, f) = (6, 2.0) 83.7 (B, f) = (1, 3.0) 69.4 (B, f) = (6, 1.0) 74.8
Dropout (B, pidrp) = (6, 0.3) 70.1 (B, pidrp) = (6, 0.1) 83.3 (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.1) 63.6 (B, pidrp) = (6, 0.1) 73.7
TABLE 8: AUC-ROC of different attack-detection sampling schemes on cats-and-dogs dataset with against FGSM and MIM
attacks. Higher values indicate better detection.
which after taking expectation yields
Eqθ(ω)[yν ] ' σsoftmax(u¯ν) . (29)
Upon defining the matrix H1 := ∇σsoftmax(u)
∣∣∣
u=u¯ν
, and
using (28) and (29), we find yν −Eqθ(ω)[yν ] ' H1(uν − u¯ν)
that leads to approximating the variance score as
Covqθ(ω)[yν ]
= Eqθ(ω)
[
(yν − Eqθ(ω)[yν ])(yν − Eqθ(ω)[yν ])>
]
' Eqθ(ω)
[
H1(uν − u¯ν)(uν − u¯ν)>H>1
]
.
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a) FGSM attack with  = 10 b) MIM attack with  = 10 c) BIM attack with  = 10
d) FGSM attack with  = 20 e) MIM attack with  = 20 f) BIM attack with  = 20
g) C&W attack h) Combination attack
Fig. 4. ROC-curve of different attack-detection sampling schemes on cats-and-dogs dataset against different attacks.
BIM Attack C&W Attack Combination Attack
Sampling  = 10  = 20
Method parameters AUC parameters AUC parameters AUC parameters AUC
VM 71.4 70.7 71.6 70.4
VM-log (B, f) = (1, 3.0) 70.3 (B, f) = (1, 3.0) 69.4 (B, f) = (2, 0.8) 56.9 (B, f) = (2, 0.7) 57.0
VM-linear 66.7 66.2 71.9 68.2
DVM-log (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 63.9 (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 63.6 (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 69.6 (B, f) = (4, 3.0) 68.1
SAP (B, f) = (1, 3.0) 67.1 (B, f) = (1, 3.0) 67.1 (B, f) = (5, 0.9) 63.8 (B, f) = (6, 1.0) 67.1
Dropout (B, pidrp) = (5, 0.6) 60.1 (B, pidrp) = (6, 0.1) 59.6 (B, pidrp) = (6, 0.5) 63.1 (B, pidrp) = (6, 0.1) 66.1
TABLE 9: AUC-ROC of different attack-detection sampling schemes on cats-and-dogs test set against BIM, C&W, and
combination attacks. Higher values indicate better detection.
The trace of the latter can be upper bounded by
Tr (Covqθ(ω)[yν ]) ≤ λ1Tr (Covqθ(ω)[uν ])
where Tr (Covqθ(ω)[uν ]) := Tr(Eqθ(ω)[(uν−u¯ν)(uν−u¯ν)>]),
and λ1 := Tr(H>1 H1) is deterministic. Thus, the output
variance score is upperbounded by that of the previous layer
up to a constant λ1. Repeating this process of approximating
uν as a function of vν = W1xν by the first-order Taylor ex-
pansion around v¯ν := EW1 [vν ], leads with H2 := ∇σ(v¯ν)
to uν and its mean compensated approximation
uν 'W2σ(v¯ν) +W2H2(vν − v¯ν) (30)
u¯ν ' EW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)]
uν − u¯ν ' EW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)]−W2σ(v¯ν) +W2H2(vν − v¯ν) .
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The latter yields the covariance approximation
Covqθ(ω)[uν ] ' CovW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)]
+ EW2 [W2H2EW1 [(vν − v¯ν)(vν − v¯ν)>]H>2 W>2 ]
+ EW2
[
W2H2EW1(vν − v¯ν)
×
(
EW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)]−W2σ(v¯ν)
)>]
= CovW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)] + EW2 [W2H2 CovW1 [vν ]H
>
2 W
>
2 ]
where we have used the independence of random matrices
W1 and W2, and EW1(vν − v¯ν) = 0. Taking the trace
and using the inequality Tr(AB) ≤ Tr(A)Tr(B) for positive
semi-definite matrices A,B ≥ 0 twice, we arrive after
defining λ2 := Tr(H>2 H2), at
Tr( Covqθ(ω)[uν ])
' CovW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)]) + EW2 [Tr(W2H2 CovW1 [vν ]H>2 W>2 )]
≤ Tr(CovW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)])
+ λ2Tr(EW2 [W2W
>
2 ])Tr( CovW1 [vν ]) .
Leveraging the last inequality, we can majorize the uncer-
tainty minimization in (14) by that in (17). This is a coupled
minimization of layer-wise variance scores Tr( CovW1 [vν ])
and Tr(CovW2 [W2σ(v¯ν)]), that we solve as follows.
Using W(TR)1 along with (4) and (6), we have W1 =
W
(TR)
1 S1D1, where S1 := diag([z1,1, z1,2, · · · , z1,h1 ]) is the
sampling matrix with its pseudo-inverse diagonal mean
D1 := diag
†
(
Eq(z;p1)[z1,1, z1,2, . . . , z1,h1 ]
)
. This implies
that v¯ν := EW1 [vν ] = W
(TR)
1 xν , which does not depend
on the sampling vector p1. As a result, the minimization in
(17) can be readily solved by the proposed subproblems. 
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To solve (22), consider the Lagrangian
L =
h∑
i=1
αi
1− e−Cpi + ρ(1
>p− 1) 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
and upon setting its gradient to zero
∂L
∂pi
=
−Cαie−Cpi
(1− e−Cpi)2 + ρ = 0 (31)
and introducing the change of variable
yi := exp(−Cpi) e−C < yi < 1
we find that (31) reduces to
ρ′y2i − (2ρ′ + αi)yi + ρ′ = 0 .
The feasible root of this quadratic polynomial is
yi =
2ρ′ + αi −
√
(2ρ′ + αi)2 − 4ρ′2
2ρ′
.
Using the simplex constraint at the optimal point, we find
− 1
C
∑
i
ln yi = 1
which after reverting the change of variable, reduces the
optimization in (22) to the following root-finding task∑
i
ln(2ρ′ + αi −
√
(2ρ′ + αi)2 − 4ρ′2)− n ln(2ρ′) +C = 0.
This scalar root-finding problem can be solved using bisec-
tion that enjoys super-linear convergence rate. 
8.3 Selection of defense parameters
In order to further provide insight on the performance
against various selection of B, f , and pi parameters, Figs. 5
and 6 illustrate the AUC-ROC for VM-exact, DVM-log, SAP,
and uniform dropout against the combination attack. As the
plots suggest, uniform dropout reaches its best performance
when placed at the last block, whereas higher performance
can be obtained by placing carefully-tuned sampling at
units in hidden layers before the last. Furthermore, at a
given block B, VM-exact demonstrates higher robustness
for different values of f ; that is, smaller fluctuation in AUC
is observed, whereas other methods are usually more prone
to under-performance given sub-optimal parameters.
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